Economy Commentary

The Economy

Growth On Solid Ground, Persistent Inflation Remains A Concern

November 2026

In last month’s edition, we discussed the results of the comprehensive annual revisions to the data from the National Economic Accounts which showed faster real GDP growth over recent quarters than had previously been reported. We noted that the revised data showed the U.S. economy to be on firmer footing heading into 2H 2026 than had previously been implied. The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) first pass at Q3 GDP supports that assessment, with BEA’s initial estimate showing real GDP expanded at an annual rate of 3.4 percent in Q3 after growing at a 2.2 percent rate in Q2. Real private domestic demand – combined household and business spending adjusted for price changes – grew at an annual rate of 4.9 percent in Q3 after having grown at a 4.5 percent rate in Q2.

Real consumer spending grew at an annual rate of 3.8 percent in Q3, adding 2.52 percentage points to top-line real GDP growth. While real consumer spending also grew at a rate of 3.8 percent in Q2, the composition of spending shifted, with Q3 seeing slower growth in spending on goods and faster growth in services spending, which accounts for roughly two-thirds of all consumer spending. Spending on discretionary services (such as travel, lodging, dining out, recreation, and entertainment) was particularly strong in Q3, in part a reflection of the wealth effects that have been a support for consumer spending over the past several quarters.

Real business fixed investment grew at an annual rate of 12.7 percent in Q3, adding 1.78 percentage to top-line real GDP growth. If we set aside 2020-21, when the data were being driven by the pandemic and the policy response to it, this is the largest contribution to real GDP growth made by business fixed investment since the third quarter of 2011. Real outlays on equipment and machinery grew at a rate of 20.9 percent in Q3 and on a year-to-date basis through Q3 are up 14.1 percent. While AI related investment has been the key catalyst for growth in spending on equipment and machinery, growth in such spending has become more broadly based over recent quarters. Real business spending on intellectual property products, the bulk of which consists of spending on R&D and computer software, grew at an 8.4 percent rate in Q3 while real business spending on structures grew at a 5.4 percent rate, with structures tied to power generation and energy exploration/production the main drivers.

To some extent, the strength of business investment spending is reflected in what was a significantly wider trade deficit in Q3. While real exports of U.S. goods rose at an annual rate of 5.7 percent, real imports into the U.S. rose at a 19.7 percent rate. Over the past several months, however, imports into the U.S. have been dominated by raw materials and intermediate capital goods excluding motor vehicles. While treated as a drag on real GDP growth upon arrival into the U.S., the reality is that these goods that will be ultimately be used by firms in the U.S. to produce finished goods, thus adding to real GDP growth down the line. To us, this is far more relevant than the treatment of such goods in GDP accounting. Either way, the wider trade deficit knocked 3.32 percentage points off Q3 real GDP growth.

There are some areas of concern in the Q3 GDP data. One is the contraction in residential fixed investment, the ninth quarterly contraction in the past ten quarters, reflecting the sharp decline in single family construction. With affordability constraints having become more binding with mortgage interest rates well over seven percent, builders are finding it increasingly difficult to pare down elevated inventories of spec homes for sale. We expect further pullbacks in single family construction over coming quarters while higher financing costs will likely weigh on multi-family construction. As such, residential fixed investment is likely to remain a drag on real GDP growth over coming quarters. Additionally, while the trend rate of real GDP growth has settled back into the trend rate seen over the course of the pre-pandemic expansion, nominal GDP growth remains considerably above its pre-pandemic trend. The gap between the two is a proxy for the pace at which prices are rising, and the FOMC will remain in play for as long as this sizable gap persists.

The higher frequency data show that the strength in the Q3 data carried into the final quarter of 2026. For instance, the monthly surveys of the manufacturing and services sectors conducted by the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) show continued expansion in both broad sectors. Most importantly, the ISM surveys show continued solid and broadly based growth in new orders in both the manufacturing and services sectors, suggesting further growth in output and employment in the months ahead. At the same time, however, the ISM surveys continue to show persistent and broadly based upward pressure on input prices which will continue to be reflected in broader measures of wholesale level and retail level inflation.

Total nonfarm employment rose by 165,000 jobs in October, considerably ahead of expectations, with private sector payrolls up by 159,000 jobs and public sector payrolls up by 6,000 jobs. At the same time, prior estimates of job growth in August and September were revised up by a net 84,000 jobs for the two-month period, with private sector job growth the beneficiary of the entire upward revision. October’s job growth was broadly based, as the one-month hiring diffusion index, a gauge of the breadth of hiring across private sector industry groups, rose to 57.6 percent. Average hourly earnings rose by 0.4 percent, leaving them up 3.1 percent year-on-year. Of greater relevance is that aggregate private sector wage and salary earnings, the largest block of personal income, rose by 0.5 percent in October, leaving them up 4.4 percent year-on-year, while the upward revision to private sector job growth led to an upward revision to earnings growth in August and September. The unemployment rate fell to 4.1 percent in October, keeping it within the narrow range it has occupied for some time now.

While it is hard to find much to not like in the October employment report, yet another notably low initial response rate to the monthly establishment survey raises questions as to the reliability of the initial estimates of nonfarm employment, hours, and earnings. This is an issue we have been pointing to not for months but for years. Over the past several months, we’ve also been pointing to what has been a high volume of seasonal adjustment noise in the monthly employment reports, which has often distorted the monthly headline job growth prints. The October employment report, however, was free of any such noise. To that point, the not seasonally adjusted data show the largest October increase in private sector payrolls since 2022, the basis for the much larger than expected increase in seasonally adjusted job growth.

As a way around what has been considerable noise in the monthly estimates of seasonally adjusted job growth, our focus has been squarely on the longer-term trends in the not seasonally adjusted data. The longer-term trend rate of private sector job growth had been notably stable since early 2025, at a rate just above what we think to be sufficient to keep the unemployment rate steady. Over the past two months, however, that trend rate has turned higher, and over the twelve months ending in October, private sector payrolls increased by an average of just under 80,000 jobs per month. Couple that with labor productivity growth having accelerated over the past three years, averaging 2.6 percent over that span, and the result is a faster trend rate of real GDP growth which, if the economy can ever break free of the supply-side shocks that have helped sustain inflation above the FOMC’s 2.0 percent target, will push inflation lower. Still, the FOMC cannot overlook the fact that inflation does remain well above its target rate, and though they opted to remain on hold at their October meeting, another twenty-five basis point hike at the December FOMC meeting cannot be ruled out.

Finally, we think it worth making some brief comments on the potential impacts of the recent midterm elections, which delivered a resounding victory for the Democrats, not only on the federal level but also on the state level. It is the results on the state level that may have the bigger impact on the pace of growth of AI investment and data center buildouts over coming years. It is, however, important to note that virtually all the proposed moratoriums on data center construction pertain to projects not yet permitted without impacting those projects already permitted or already underway, a pipeline which is substantial. As such, curbs on data center construction may not become apparent in the broader economic data until 2028.

On the near-term horizon, a continuing resolution to fund the federal government must be in place by December 11 to avoid another government shutdown. While the “lame duck” Congress may steer such a resolution through, it could be a very short-term measure, leaving a more lasting resolution for the new Congress to produce in early 2027. The new Congress is also likely to attempt to restore funding cuts to various health care programs and could attempt to roll back changes to the tax code passed into law in the summer of 2025. The administration, however, still maintains veto power and the Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate will not be large enough to override vetoes without help from Senate Republicans. On the whole, however, we cannot rule out already sizable federal government budget deficits growing even wider, and the U.S. fiscal path is likely to remain a key concern amongst fixed income investors and market participants.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Census Bureau; Institute for Supply Management

As of November 13, 2026